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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 China and the United States operate on different spectrums of world politics. China has grown by 
leaps and bounds and managed to do so with a modern controversial communist government. On the 
other hand, the United States, a republic since its independence, has been the unchallenged leader of both 
world economics and politics.  When these two countries interact, the results have had important 
implications for international politics. But, they have not always been moving toward a more 
collaborative international environment.  
 The United States did not initially recognize the People‟s Republic of China as a country because 
it was a communist state. That early denial of China‟s existence was the beginning of what grew into a 
rollercoaster ride of bilateral relations. In the past two decades, disputes between China and the United 
States have increased.  Whether it is Taiwan, Iraq, Chinese currency manipulation, spy planes, or out-
sourcing jobs to China, the two countries were constantly at odds with each other. China has even 
threatened to sanction the U.S. and to drop support of certain international issues. The U.S. and China are 
two very different countries, both in culture and political ideology, yet they are dependent on each other. 
The Economist considers the relationship between China and the United States as the most important 
association between nations of the era.  
For this thesis, we will examine how economic growth has led to China‟s emerging international 
role in the twenty-first century and, specifically, China‟s relationship with the United States. How have 
China‟s economic rise and the recent December 2008 global recession affected bilateral relations with the 
United States? Does the U.S. react differently given the economic circumstances? 
 The rising tension in U.S.-China bilateral relations has important ramifications for the future of 
world politics. China has one of the richest histories in the world. Even modern China has been the arena 
for many significant international events. It has outlasted the European colonialists, ousted the invading 
Japanese, and outlived its Soviet neighbors. China‟s later development and growth led to greater 
involvement in international affairs in the twenty-first century. This has made the United States both a 
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business partner and economic rival. The fundamental problem, however, is that both sides lack an 
understanding of how the other actually works. 
 This research will contribute to the field of international relations because it will explain the 
actions of both an aging superpower and a rising powerhouse. Not since the Cold War has the United 
States faced a rival with leverage when it comes to economic power. This makes for a thought-provoking 
analysis of how United States has dealt with China in the past and what this means for the future. As a 
result of this analysis, people will gain a better understanding of why U.S.-China relations are so 
complicated, sensitive, and worth learning about to solve current issues. Otherwise, rising tension could 
lead to an arms race, thereby creating yet a new international security dilemma. 
Because this research reveals the connection between economic growth and rising tensions, it is 
in America‟s best interest to engage China with caution and work with Europe to keep the international 
market competitive. The West should not panic to the point of causing an unnecessary confrontation with 
China. Instead of attempting a protectionist strategy, the United States should encourage China to take up 
its share of the burden of global leadership. As the world‟s largest exporter, China‟s own self-interest lies 
in a peaceful and robust trading system. In this globalized world, economies can dictate the progress of 
diplomacy. If the United States wants to avoid tensions with China, it must understand how China views 
the world and what its goals are for the future.  
The theoretical framework for this thesis will be the realist school in international relations. 
Realism in international relations prioritizes national interest and security rather than ideals, social 
reconstruction or ethics. This so-called power politics focuses on the state as a single unit. China‟s 
decision to increase state power through aggressive incentives to persuade companies to invest in China 
and to use revenue to increase military force may have created something of a global security dilemma.  
This thesis will also include constructivist viewpoints due to China‟s strong historical background 
influences on policy implementation and U.S. insistence on maintaining the status quo. Although realism 
and constructivism are two different theories, they work together in explaining both national interest and 
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ideology. World politics cannot be explained simply with one theory and considering other factors is 
important to getting a complete picture of the current situation. 
In terms of variables, the dependent variable in this case is the tension between China and the 
United States, both of which have different views on how nations should work together. The independent 
variables that most strongly correlate with the dependent variable are China‟s self-serving and 
competitive foreign policy, its historical autocratic political background, its large demand for resources, 
and trade relations with the U.S.  We will measure China‟s GDP growth for the last two decades along 
with spending, investments, and policies that promote trade and interactions between countries. The goal 
is to correlate China‟s economic growth to the rise in disputes between the United States and China.  
The structure of this paper begins with a brief historical background of China, touching upon 
China‟s evolution from the imperial dynasties to a communist state. We also will explore various cultural 
influences that explain how the modern Chinese state rationalizes decisions. In the next chapters, the 
interactions between China and the U.S. are split into three time periods. The first period notes 
interactions from 1989 to 2004 (the gradual increase in China‟s GDP), the second focuses from 2004 to 
2008 (from China‟s spike in GDP to the financial crisis in 2008), and the third examines bilateral 
relations after the financial crisis. The paper will analyze quantitative data including China‟s gross 
domestic product (GDP), resources, domestic and overseas investments, and how the recent stock market 
crash has affected China compared to the United States.  The paper will conclude with a summary of the 
data found, how research could have been expanded, and predictions for the future of U.S.-China 
relations.  The paper is structured to measure the relationship by meanings of “positive” and “negative” 
interactions. Positive interactions are incidents in which both countries benefit in a political, economic, or 
emotional way and those interactions accomplish mutual goals of the states. Negative interactions do not 
benefit either state.  These negative events can include feelings of anger towards a country because of 
mistakes made or because of a policy that harms the other country. 
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Chapter 2: A Brief History on U.S.-China Relations and Economics 
 
 China, or the Middle Kingdom, has over five thousand years of history.  China ruled the East 
Asian coast with a powerful central monarchy.  It maintained self-sufficiency and influenced cultures 
around it, including Korea and Japan.  Though China traded with the West, it felt as though the 
encroaching Western traders had nothing to offer such a superior country. However, the West thought the 
trade imbalance was not favorable. It changed its strategy from trading in gold to trading in highly 
addictive opium. China‟s opium addiction lead to the country‟s first of many downfalls. Coupled with an 
often corrupt government and lack of innovation stemming from ethnocentricity, China lost to the West in 
the Opium Wars. Defeat by the British decreased China‟s power over its own lands. Since1858, with the 
signing of the first of many concessions such as the Treaties of Tianjin, the Chinese people have struggled 
to gain back their autonomy.
1
 China, after realizing it was not going to receive independence after the 
First World War, started a new movement of westernizing its ideology and turning towards democracy, 
nationalism, and for some, Marxism.
2
 
 The United States entered the political scene as China struggled to unify itself. The U.S. 
supported the more democratic Nationalist Party of China. Unfortunately, because the Nationalists 
exploited their power over the people, they fell out of favor with the majority of the Chinese population. 
The Communist Party, on the other hand, worked to gain the support of the peasant class, claiming that all 
people are equal under communism. Since China‟s majority belonged to the peasant class, the Communist 
Party gained widespread support amongst the people. During World War II, the Nationalists and 
Communists worked together to push out their common enemy, the Japanese. When the war was over, the 
two sides became enemies once again. With dwindling support from the people, not even the Americans 
could help the Nationalists keep China. 
                                                          
1
 June Grasso et al., Modernization and Revolution in China. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 42, 83. 
2
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 83. 
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The Communists ousted the U.S. backed Nationalists during the civil war in the mid to late 1940s 
and Mao Zedong officially declared China as a communist state on October 1, 1949.
3
 The United States 
“lost” China to communism and refused to recognize China so long as it remained a communist state. 
This did not last long. After the Korean War (1950-1953), both countries agreed that bilateral relations 
would benefit one another.
4
 The PRC even replaced Taiwan as the official representation of China in the 
United Nations in 1971.
5
 After several meetings between ambassadors from 1954-1970 and President 
Richard Nixon‟s visit to China in 1971, formal diplomatic relations were established in 1978.6 From this 
point forward, the United States and China have experienced various degrees of cooperation on important 
bilateral and international issues. 
 The paper‟s analysis of U.S.-China relations begins in 1989. This time period from 1989 to 2010 
was chosen because 1989 signified a changing Chinese political dynamic. By 1989, the dictatorship 
aspect in China‟s government started to fade. With the death of Mao and the closing of Deng Xiaoping‟s 
reform era, China began to move towards a more consensus type government where no one person had all 
of the authority. Before President Jiang Zemin, all of the actions of the Chinese government could be 
attributed to the dictator in power (either Mao or Deng). In contrast, Jiang Zemin was not as well known 
but he did fit the criteria for Deng as a successor. But, unlike Deng, Jiang had to win support since it was 
not simply handed to him.
7
 The same applied to Hu Jintao when he succeeded Jiang. The third generation 
of China‟s leaders had to rely on consensus with other party members to push through policies. In the past 
two decades, consensus politics within the Chinese government has allowed for more credibility and 
appealed to U.S. political ideology. 
The new generation of China‟s leaders was mainly focused on fixing the flawed Chinese 
economic system. The potential for China‟s economy lies both in its strategic geographic location and its 
                                                          
3
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 139-142. 
4
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Background Note: China (10/09),” U.S. State 
Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm. 
5
 The Office of Electronic Information, “Background Note: China (10/09).” 
6
The Office of Electronic Information, “Background Note: China (10/09).” 
7
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 264. 
H o u  | 7 
 
resources.  Asia has an abundance of natural resources that can be used for self-sufficiency and as 
leverage in trading with foreign countries. China‟s natural resources include coal, iron ore, petroleum, 
natural gas, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, 
lead, zinc, uranium, and the world‟s largest hydropower potential.8 However, the most abundant resource 
China has is its people. With over a billion people, a lot of work can be accomplished in a short time 
period. To utilize all that it has, China has encouraged innovation, new technology, and infrastructure. It 
has drawn  in foreign investors who wanted to cut their costs. 
 For China to be a top world competitor, all Deng Xiaoping had to do was allow China‟s economy 
to grow in a capitalist environment. Deng wanted to modernize agriculture, industry, science and 
technology. To do so, he motivated the nation through material incentives which contrasted with Mao‟s 
ideological incentives for self-sufficiency.
9
 Within agriculture, Deng eliminated the communes and gave 
land back to farmers. Farmers then signed a ten to fifteen year contract with the government stating that 
they would provide a certain amount to the government but would also be able to sell the remaining 
surplus.
10
 Farmers also were allowed to have side occupations, which encouraged the development of 
entrepreneurs.
11
 People, for the first time, had money to spend on consumer products. Per capita GDP 
rose from $307.49 in 1989 to $ 3,266.51 in 2008.
12
  
In the industrial sector, the government set up special economic zones (SEZs) along the coast to 
encourage foreign companies to set up industries or establish joint-enterprises with Chinese firms.
13
 China 
offered cheap labor, land, and tax incentives. Cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen boomed because of the 
numerous western firms that entered the cities. According to China Daily, almost 480 of the Fortune 500 
                                                          
8
 “The World Factbook: China,” CIA (2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2111.html. 
9
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 241. 
10
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 242. 
11
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 242. 
12
 Nation Master, “Economy Statistics > GDP (per capita) (1989) by country,” Nationmaster.com, 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_percap-economy-gdp-per-capita&date=1989 and CIA, “The World 
Factbook: China.” 
13
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 248. 
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hundred companies have invested in China in the past 30 years.
14
  With foreign investors coming in, 
China gained access to advanced foreign technology that continued to help the economy grow despite the 
social ramifications of Deng‟s reforms. 
 Another important factor that brought China to the world stage was the impact of the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre in June 1989. As the government let in western innovation, western democratic ideology 
also leaked into China. China‟s top officials feared the same kind of hysteria would break out at 
Tiananmen Square like it did during the 1960s Cultural Revolution.
15
 In an effort to stamp out dissent 
amongst the students, intellectuals, and workers, Deng Xiaoping ordered martial law over the protests at 
Tiananmen Square.
16
 This resulted in large amounts of international backlash.
17
 While the failures of 
Mao‟s programs remained relatively unknown, China‟s new globalization policies made this massacre 
visible to the entire world. Because of the incident, the U.S. government suspended military sales to 
Beijing and froze bilateral relations.
18
 Mending U.S.–Sino relations had to start all over again. 
 The Tiananmen Square Massacre signaled the rise of a new generation of leaders in China. Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao had to worry not only about continuing to run a more liberal economic environment 
but also about international scrutiny of China‟s information censorship and human rights violations. 
Furthermore, China‟s economic success has made western countries uneasy but China‟s leaders claim 
China‟s rise was not a threat to the world, calling it a “peaceful rise” and later “peaceful development”.19 
 Because economic interdependency brings countries together through trade and politics, China 
and the United States inevitability would be drawn to each other. The United States wanted the cheap 
labor and material that could be produced in China for a fraction of the cost it would take to make 
products domestically. China wanted access to the technological advances of U.S. built facilities on the 
                                                          
14
 “Most of world’s top companies invest in China,” Xinhua (2008), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-
05/05/content_6662316.htm. 
15
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 259-262. 
16
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 259-262. 
17
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 262. 
18
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949 - Present),” Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17698/. 
19
 The Economist, “Peaceful Rise,” The Economist print edition (2004), http://www.economist.com. 
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mainland. These factors (explained in depth in later chapters) prompted China and the U.S. to make 
government policies that were favorable to the development of trade. 
Especially in the twenty-first century, U.S.-Sino trade relations rose dramatically. Between 1980 and 
2004, trade rose from five billion to over two hundred one billion USD.
20
 In 2000, Congress granted 
Beijing permanent normal trade relations.
21
 China replaced the United States as Japan‟s top trade partner 
and replaced Mexico as the United States‟ second-biggest trade partner.22 As seen from the graph below, 
China‟s influence in international trade increased dramatically from 1950 to 2000 alongside that of the 
U.S. Normalized relations proved to be beneficial for both countries.
 (The graph above shows China‟s growing influence over trade from 1500 to 2000) 
                                                          
20
Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
21
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
22
Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
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Awareness of U.S. and Chinese interdependence increased in 2008 with the onset of the global financial 
crisis. By 2008, China had the third largest economy in the world and held $1.7 trillion in U.S. debt.
23
 
Referring to the graph above, one can see how much China has grown in relations to other countries 
and regions
 24
. Referring to the chart below, one can see that as China‟s influence has risen 
exponentially, the United States‟ influence has declined since the world financial crisis.25  
 
 All of China‟s new found wealth comes with a price. Being a rising power means not only 
increased economic power but also increased responsibility in politics. Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick gave a speech in September 2005 that recognized China as an emerging power but also called on 
China to involve itself in international affairs.
26
 Zoellick wanted China to draw nations like Sudan, North 
Korea, and Iran into the international system, since China has the potential to become a very influential 
mediator between democratic and non-democratic nations as shown in the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing 
in 2005. North Korea walked away from the negotiations, which focused on controlling Pyongyang‟s 
nuclear ambitions and denuclearization, but returned to the table the following year and in 2008, thanks to 
                                                          
23
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
24
Catherine Mulbrandon, “Share of GDP: China, India, Japan, Latin America, Western Europe, United States,” 
Visualizing Economics (2008), http://www.visualizingeconomics.com/2008/01/20/share-of-world-gdp/. 
25
 “The World Factbook: China,” CIA (2010) and Nation Master, “Economy Statistics: GDP by country.” 
26
Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
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efforts made by the Chinese.
27
 Though future G-20 talks have not shown the resulted desired by the U.S. 
and other countries, China during this G-20 has shown itself as a key played in international politics and 
gained credibility for its success in returning North Korea to the negotiation table. 
 Growth in China‟s economy worries the United States. China announced an 18% budget increase 
in defense spending to more than $45 billion in 2007.
28
 Since 1990, increases in military expenditures 
have averaged about 15% a year.  This would seem directly in opposition of the “peaceful rise” China‟s 
leaders keep emphasizing.  Former Vice President Dick Cheney said China‟s military buildup is not 
consistent with its stated goal though, China‟s budget pales in comparison to the U.S. defense budget of 
$481 billion.
29
 The U.S. also has 41.5% of global military spending while China comes in second with 
5.8%.
30
 China spent about 2% of GDP while the U.S. spent 4% of GDP in 2007.
31
  Obviously, China‟s 
military capacity is still nowhere near that of the United States, though China‟s relative power in the 
Asian Pacific has increased dramatically in the past twenty years.  An increase in relative power, however, 
could create a security dilemma if both the U.S. and China fail to communicate intentions with their 
actions. 
In the next chapters, the interactions between China and the U.S. will be split into three sections 
based on significant changes in each country‟s GDP. The first period will analyze interactions from 1989 
to 2004, when there was a gradual increase in China‟s GDP; the second period will focus from 2005 to 
2008, when from China‟s GDP spiked to the financial crisis in 2008; and the third period will examine 
bilateral relations after the financial crisis. When both countries are doing well, are there more 
investments and fewer criticisms? When one country does worse than the other, do political issues emerge? 
The goal of these chapters is to find the answers to these questions and to determine how both countries 
economic circumstances correlate with their bilateral relations. 
                                                          
27
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
28
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
29
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
30 “The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2009,” SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/, and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State of World Population 
2009: Facing a Changing World-Women, Climate and Population (UNFPA: New York, 2009), p. 91. 
31
 “The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2009,” SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2009). 
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Chapter 3: The Timeline 
 
Part 1: China and the U.S. from 1989-2004 
 
 The first part of analyzing U.S.-Ch relations focuses on the years 1989 to 2004. This section was 
chosen because 1989 was the year that U.S.-China relations had to be reset given the worldwide attention 
to the Tiananmen Square Massacre. The timeline stops at 2004 because from 1989 to 2004, the United 
States and China both experienced a steady growth in GDP. When both countries were doing well, their 
interactions were mixed, as if a power struggle existed between the states. Following the Cold War, the 
United States emerged as a world leader. The U.S. involved itself with the politics of a lot of different 
countries, including China. China, cutting off its friendly ties with the former Soviet Union and adopting 
a capitalist market, also began to see improvements within its own economy. China was still a developing 
country, but it made its presence known to the rest of the world when controversies appeared. 
 Between 1989 and 2004, many incidents occurred showing how unstable U.S. and China bilateral 
relations actually were.  In 1989, news of the Tiananmen Square Massacre was heard around the world, 
causing the U.S. to cut its ties with China. In 1995, Harry Wu, a Chinese-American, was captured by the 
Chinese government for his documentation of prisons. In 1999, the U.S. accidentally bombed the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, and in 2001 a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet. In addition to these 
confrontations, Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights disputes also put constant strains on relations. 
The year 1989 was an important year in the development of bilateral relations between the United 
States and China. Amidst Chinese capitalist ideas and the influx of foreign direct investment there was a 
very powerful central government that did not tolerate political dissent. As Communist leader Deng 
Xiaoping allowed foreigners to bring technology and goods into China, western ideology also managed to 
leak through as well. Intellectuals, once chastised by Mao‟s regime, now saw their chance to speak out 
against communism and promote democracy.
32
 In the late 1980s the pro-democracy movement spread to 
                                                          
32
 June Grasso et al., Modernization and Revolution in China. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 251. 
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students and workers.
33
 The protestors wanted the communist party and government to be more 
transparent. The majority of these protestors were university students who saw the benefits that foreigners 
received in China and demanded that Chinese people be treated the same way.
34
 Some held rallies and 
small protests in major cities like Shanghai but these were lacking in support and were easily defused by 
the government either by force or compromise.
35
   
In the following years, the government faced more and more economic and social problems. 
Inflation hit China in 1988 and regulations proved futile in controlling it. The pro-democracy movement 
gathered strength while Party unity weakened.
36
 
 In April 1989, political leader and democracy-advocate Hu Yaobang passed away. His death 
sparked a series of protests at Tiananmen Square and throughout Beijing.
37
 Students waged hunger strikes 
and held peaceful demonstrations for weeks as the government tried to figure out what to do with 
thousands of protestors.  Due to the presence of the international media, all of this was caught on camera 
for the whole world to watch. Deng saw the similarities between the Beijing protests and the horrors of 
Mao‟s Cultural Revolution. What he saw as turmoil, the students saw as patriotism. On June 3, the 
crackdown on protestors began. Tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, people were shot, and bodies were 
burned.
38
  No one knows how many people were killed, although estimates range from tens to several 
thousand.
39
 Dissidents captured were thrown into jail and given extended prison sentences. Surveillance 
of citizens increased and education requirements for students were changed to include countryside labor 
programs and communist ideology tests. In response to the massacre, the U.S. government suspended 
military sales to Beijing and froze relations.
40
   
                                                          
33
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 254. 
34
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 252. 
35
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 253. 
36
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 256. 
37
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 256-258. 
38
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 258-259. 
39
 Grasso, Modernization and Revolution in China, 258. 
40
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949 - Present),” Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17698/ (accessed March 21, 2010). 
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The Tiananmen Square Massacre was not the end of U.S.-China political stand-offs. In 1995, 
U.S.-China relations remained tense as an American-Chinese named Harry Wu was captured by Chinese 
officials. Harry Wu, a human rights activist, was given a nineteen year sentence by the Chinese 
government for documenting what he termed as “laogai” prisoner camps.41  In the 1990‟s, he went 
undercover to China four times to document of how prisoners were treated in prison camps there.
42
 He 
wanted the whole world to see what China was doing behind closed doors.  When he was caught in 1995, 
he was held by the government for sixty-six days and awaited his sentence.
43
 This incident was one of 
many that strained relations between China and the U.S. since the Tiananmen Square Massacre.
44
 
Fortunately, the Chinese government released Wu, deporting him the States. Then, President Clinton said 
the release provided a much-needed improvement in bilateral relations.
45
 Although there were still many 
issues to tackle, at least Wu would not be sent to prison in China as the U.S. had feared he would. 
Harry Wu‟s arrest exemplified the mixed relations China and the United States engaged in at the 
time.  Wu was charged with espionage but was released into U.S. control within two months. The Chinese 
government took Wu‟s actions seriously, but amending relations with the U.S. was more important to its 
long term goals of international inclusion. Even though relations were tense, both countries were willing 
to negotiate. By sending Wu back, China avoided a diplomatic crisis. 
In 1999, yet another incident shook the already-rocky relationship between the U.S. and China. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
in its campaign against Serbian forces over Kosovo.
46
 President Bill Clinton and NATO command offered 
their apologies for the mistake but that did not stop thousands of protestors in China from condemning the 
U.S. for its actions. Several flaws in the targeting procedure had resulted in the accidental bombing of the 
                                                          
41
Harry Wu, “I was sentenced to life in a Chinese labour camp: This is my story,” The Independent (2009), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/i-was-sentenced-to-life-in-a-chinese-labour-camp-this-is-my-
story-1790465.html. 
42
 Wu, “I was sentenced to life in a Chinese labour camp: This is my story.” 
43
 Wu, “I was sentenced to life in a Chinese labour camp: This is my story.” 
44
 Anthony Spaeth et al., “Harry Wu: He’s Out,” Time (1995), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983376,00.html. 
45
 Spaeth et al., “Harry Wu: He’s Out.” 
46
 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949 - Present).” 
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embassy. NATO had wanted to target a supply headquarters but the exact location needed to be identified. 
In reference to the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) statement on the bombing on July 22, 
1999, George Tenet stated: 
First, the technique used to locate the intended target – the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal 
Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP) – was severely flawed. Second, none of the military or 
intelligence databases used to validate targets contained the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. Third, 
nowhere in the target review process was either of the first two mistakes detected.
47
 
 
The maps used to target the location were from 1989, 1996 and 1997, and there were not any signs from 
satellite imaging to designate the building as an embassy.
48
 The attack proceeded even though some in the 
department believed that the FDSP was not located correctly.
49
 After the attack, four people were reported 
dead and another twenty injured.
50
 Angry protests about the bombing sprang up throughout China. 
Beijing did little to control the protests and in fact, then-Vice President Hu Jintao announced his support 
for the protests, which he considered a legal protest of NATO‟s actions.51 China had already opposed the 
NATO campaign against Yugoslavia and interpreted this attack as an attack on Chinese sovereignty.
52
 
The protests created a problem for U.S.  in China. U.S. diplomatic buildings had to be closed for the 
safety of the people working inside.
53
   
 Though the bombing was a blunder, China did not treat it as such. The government even allowed 
people to go into the streets to protest. But no matter how angry people were about the attack, China did 
not seek further reparations from the U.S. The Chinese government reasoned that additional aggravation 
of the situation would not benefit either nation. 
The first U.S.-China incident that the newly-elected Bush Administration had to deal with was the 
spy plane incident in 2001. On April 1, two Chinese fighter pilots were tailing a U.S. surveillance plane 
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when one of them collided with it.
54
 The U.S. plane made an emergency landing on Hainan Island while 
the Chinese plane crashed into the South China Sea.
55
 While Chinese and U.S. reports vary, one of the 
planes made a sudden turn in the air. Chinese officials blamed the U.S. for the accident and vice-versa. 
China said the plane was in their airspace. U.S. military experts said that China was harassing the plane in 
international airspace.
56
 China told the U.S. it reserved the right to seize the plane and its crew, since the 
plane had landed without permission from the Chinese government.
57
 The U.S. demanded the release of 
the crew and plane immediately but China retained both. The crew ultimately was released on April 11 
and the plane was returned in July.
58
 
U.S-China relations with the new Bush Administration got off to a terrible start. The new 
administration during that year had changed its policy to focus on strengthening ties with China but this 
incident set everyone back a step.
59
 In War of Necessity War of Choice, author Richard Haas commented 
that China‟s reaction strengthened the hand of those U.S. officials in the administration who saw a rising 
China as a growing competitor and wanted the U.S. to emphasize containment over engagement and 
integration.
60
 As mentioned before, cooperation would be the best policy for both. Unfortunately, China‟s 
reaction this time was not favorable to bilateral relations.  The spy plane incident also brought about 
questions regarding China‟s policies: Why was China in international waters and why did it take so long 
for it to return the plane? Were the Chinese inspecting the plane for technological secrets? The Chinese 
government would not disclose what it had done with the plane. As with these other cases, U.S.-China 
confrontations in general have been tense. The two sides have different objectives and do not see eye-to-
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eye when dealing with these types of situations. Disagreements also arise over issues that China considers 
to be domestic but also involve the United States.  
 Two territories that China would rather deal with as domestic issues are Taiwan and Tibet. United 
States involvement in these two territories has strained relations in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries.  In 1949, 
the Nationalist Party of China retreated to the island of Taiwan when defeated by the Communists.
61
 It 
took control of the island, established a government, and continued to claim that it was the legitimate 
government of China.
62
 The U.S. initially supported Taiwan and did not recognize the People‟s Republic 
of China as a legitimate country. But, as relations warmed between China and the U.S., Taiwan lost its 
seat in the United Nations in 1971 and the U.S. declared that it would recognize the PRC as the legitimate 
China in 978.
63
 In 1996, the P.R.C. conducted military exercises near Taiwan to intimidate the country 
after the former President of Taiwan made a private visit to the United States.
64
 The issue was resolved 
peacefully, but interactions between Taiwan and the U.S. were closely watched by China. China 
ultimately wants Taiwan to reunite with the mainland but for now, even though trade is going well 
between the two countries. The U.S. has had a long relationship with Taiwan and is bound by treaties to 
protect. The PRC does not approve of that relationship. 
 Tibet also has claimed independence from China. Tibet had been controlled by China on and off 
since the 18
th
 century.
65
 Tibetans gave up their independence in 1951 when China invaded militarily and 
allowed the P.R.C. to control their foreign affairs and defense. Soon afterwards, however, rebellions 
began to arise. In 1959, with the help of the C.I.A. since the U.S. was still opposed to communist China at 
the time, the rebellions became a revolt, which lasted until 1971.
66
 Even after China reformed its 
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management of Tibet, the Tibetans were not satisfied and protested again in 1987, 1993, and 1995.
67
 The 
U.S. has criticized how China has incurred human rights violations with its violent suppression of these 
protestors, their religion, and way of life.
68
 However, nothing actually has been done to actually punish 
China for its actions against Tibet. In fact, the U.S. has overlooked these matters to a degree in order to 
maintain good relations with China.  
Not all bilateral interactions have been negative because China has worked to improve its 
international image. In 1993, China released a political prisoner and continued this policy as it tried to bid 
for hosting the Olympics. In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization and announced its 
support for the U.S.‟s war on terror. In 2004, China announced its “peaceful rise” policy in light of 
international fears over China‟s military capabilities.  
In 1993, to try to improve its international image, China released Wei Jingsheng, a political 
prisoner since 1979.
69
 Unfortunately, after Beijing lost its bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games, the 
government imprisoned Wei once again.
70
 President Bill Clinton then met with President Jiang Zemin at a 
summit and launched a policy of “constructive engagement” with China.71 Four years later, Clinton 
secured the release of Wei and Tiananmen Square protester Wang Dan. Beijing deported both dissidents 
to the United States.
72
 This incident shows how even though the Clinton years were a tense period in 
relations, both countries were still willing to work together. 
 In 2001, China finally entered the World Trade Organization after thirteen years and many 
setbacks like the Belgrade bombings, protectionism in the U.S., and human rights violations in China.
73
 
China agreed to lower tariffs and abolished market impediments that allowed foreign businessmen to 
import and export without government interference.
74
 By 2005, average tariff rates on key U.S. 
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agricultural exports dropped from 31% to 14% and on industrial products from 25% to 9%.
75
 The 
agreement also allowed foreign providers of services like banking, insurance and telecommunications to 
open businesses in China. 
China also played a large role in global counterterrorism efforts with the United States starting in 
2001. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, China 
offered strong public support against terrorism and has remained an important partner in U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.
76
 Shortly after 9-11, the United States and China commenced a counter-terrorism 
dialogue. Inspections under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) began at the major ports of Shenzhen, 
Shanghai, and Hong Kong.
77
 China also agreed to take part in the Department of Energy's Megaports 
Initiative to detect the flow of nuclear materials.
78
 
Lastly, in 2004, China announced its “peaceful rise” campaign as the West began to fear China‟s 
military and economic potential. China claimed that it would never seek hegemony and was a peace-
loving nation.
79
 The U.S. feared that China would rise to be an aggressor like Germany or Japan, but 
China has never mounted a direct challenge to the U.S. and instead has been trying to avoid future 
disputes. China refocused its international policy and signed treaties with other East Asian countries to 
promote trade and reduce territorial disputes.
80
 China even tried to avoid the provocative sounding phrase 
“peaceful rise.” President Hu went so far s to use the word “peace” or “peaceful” eleven times during a 
forum speech about China‟s new economic status in April 2004 but not the word “rise”.81 China wanted 
to appear as non-threatening as possible as it advanced towards being one of the top economic powers in 
the world. 
 Given the examples above, we can see that China and the United States since 1989 have been on 
a rocky road towards progress.  China faced controversies over human rights, territorial disputes, and the 
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complications of becoming a world trading partner. The U.S. dealt with accidental attacks on China and 
opposed its policies on dissent. But in the end, the U.S.‟s main goal of opening up China remained intact. 
China‟s best interests also involved cooperation and engagement.  Both sides knew that disputes would 
only hinder the flow of trade, yet both nations still stood their ground in certain circumstances.  China 
thought it needed to show the world it must be taken seriously as a legitimate and rising power. On the 
other hand, the U.S. wanted to maintain its place as a world leader with responsibility for other nations‟ 
dilemmas.  
 
Part 2: 2004 to the Early 2008 
 
From 2004 onward, China‟s GDP spiked. Its annual growth, by this time, increased about 9% per 
year.  By 2008, according to the purchasing power parity, China had the second largest economy in the 
world. China‟s economic strategies proved to be an amazing success. It lent out land cheaply to foreign 
investors and produced materials for a fraction of the cost compared to competitors. It also joined the 
World Trade Organization to further expand international trade. This new focus on trade and economics 
affected the political relationship between China and the United States. From 2005 to early 2008, U.S.-
China relations revolved around trade issues more than anything else. When they encountered other 
matters of international policy, U.S. and China were on the same side. China‟s boom in economic growth 
along side of America‟s own steady growth led to fewer confrontations. 
China expanded its role as an international figure head as its government declared support for the 
U.S. after 9/11, hosted the Six Party Talks in 2005, hosted in the Summer 2008 Olympics, and reaffirmed 
the One-China policy. There are also key points of the trade issues between the U.S. and China. Though 
these two countries were dependent on one another for materials and income, it is very clear the U.S. 
depended on more China. As a result, U.S. tried to find ways to combat the imbalance of trade.  
Since the 9/11 attacks, China has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  In fact, the anti-
American feelings of the 1990s have decreased because China also lost its own citizens in the terrorist 
attacks. China and the United States share an interest in preventing terrorist activities, particularly those 
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of Islamic fundamentalists. China, as a neighbor state of Afghanistan, has long been affected by rising 
Islamic fundamentalism in the region.
82
 The U.S. established a Federal Bureau of Investigation office in 
Beijing and stationed officers in ports along Shanghai and Shenzhen.
83
 However, China‟s struggle with its 
Xinjiang Province rebels was a source of disagreement since the U.S. considered them freedom fighters 
and felt China‟s efforts were human rights violations.84 China‟s close ties with Pakistan and desire to 
maintain friendly relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors has lead to gaps within U.S. - China policy 
towards terrorism.
85
 Though China has allowed the U.S. to station officials on the mainland, it has made 
no major changes in its foreign policy. China‟s actions do show, however, that it is concerned with the 
growing global terrorist threat and willing to work with the United States on the issue. 
Another example of China‟s new leadership role in international politics was the 2005 round of 
the Six Party Talks. These talks involve China, United States, Russia, Japan, North and South Korea and 
the goal has been to end North Korea‟s nuclear program through peaceful negotiations. The 2005 
negotiations resulted in an agreement in September o f that year in which North Korea declared that it 
would cease to become a nuclear state.
86
 In exchange, the other countries would provide it with food and 
energy assistance. China played a significant role in these talks, since, being North Korea‟s ally and 
trading partner, it was able to convince the Kim regime to come to the negotiation table.
87
 This made 
China important in the eyes of Washington for its ability to help bring stability to the Asian-Pacific region. 
This marked a significant change in U.S.-China relations as each side worked together to tackle the 
common issue of international security. 
In regards to China‟s domestic issues, the U.S. stance towards Taiwan remained a challenge. In 
the July 9, 2007 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional 
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Research Service, the U.S. affirmed five main points about U.S. foreign policy towards the PRC and 
Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan; it acknowledged the 
“One China” position on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan‟s status remains undetermined to this 
point. The U.S. has tried not to interfere with the PRC and Taiwan‟s dispute over political matters, yet in 
2007, it announced its intent to sell weapons to Taiwan, which once again stirred up the Chinese 
government.
88
 China urged the U.S. not do this but the U.S. Congress was unwilling corporate with 
Beijing.
89
 Situations like these could deter China from being more cooperative with the United States in 
the future. Fortunately, China during the twenty-first century has been more preoccupied with developing 
its new international image than engaging in debates about its domestic social issues.  
Hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics was yet another big milestone for China. But, organizing the 
Olympics brought some of China‟s problems to the international public. On March 10, 2008, the forty-
ninth anniversary of Tibet‟s take-over by China, demonstrations there turned violent.90  China‟s 
government ordered a blackout of all communication in the region.
91
 The other countries‟ protestors tried 
to prevent the Olympic torch from reaching its destination in China.
92
 The U.S. called on China to show 
restraint for the protestors in Tibet, but in the aftermath, many buildings were damaged and civilians 
killed.
93
 In April, Congress created the “Communist Chinese Olympic Accountability Act”, a bill 
prohibiting President Bush or any other federal government official from attending the Beijing 
Olympics.
94
 The bill did not pass but Tibet incident was a reminder of the tensions with the United States. 
Human rights will always be an issue between the two states. While China wanted the world to mind its 
own business about its domestic affairs, its new international status means that it will be closely 
scrutinized by the international community. These changing global conditions have also changed the way 
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the U.S. and China handle economic policy. Although China and the U.S. are neither allies nor enemies, 
both benefit from bilateral trade but also are competitors for the same resources.  
Trade deficits have caused a lot of strain on the U.S. economy. Its dependence on Chinese goods 
in recent years has affected the balance of trade and every month the balance increases, in favor of China. 
In 2006, the U.S. imported about five to seven times the number of goods it exported to China.
95
 Per the 
chart below on US Trade with China in 2006, the total U.S. trade deficit into China was more than 232 
billion U.S. dollars. From January to August 2007, the imbalance for U.S. exports already reached 163 
billion U.S. dollars. The U.S. hasn‟t been able to compete with cheap goods coming from China and 
many U.S. companies have had to lower prices, outsource labor, or go out of business.
96
 In 2006, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson tried to start a new dialogue with China. He wanted China to revalue 
its currency against the dollar and raise Chinese export prices to encourage domestic spending.
97
 China 
responded favorably by raising their Yuan by 14% and allowing U.S. industries into Chinese markets.
98
 
The U.S. wanted to do more to improve the trade deficit but it is uncertain how much China will be 
willing to bend.  
US Trade with China: 2006  
NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars.  
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2006  3,479.4  21,382.5  -17,903.1  
February 2006  4,098.4  17,905.4  -13,807.0  
March 2006  4,958.9  20,531.3  -15,572.4  
April 2006  4,328.4  21,459.1  -17,130.7  
May 2006  4,500.9  22,317.6  -17,816.7  
June 2006  4,348.0  23,989.7  -19,641.7  
July 2006  5,060.0  24,632.0  -19,572.0  
                                                          
95
“U.S. Trade in goods with China in 2006 and 2007,” Unsbiz.com (October 2007), 
http://en.unsbiz.com/news.do?method=view&id=00200709291193624539990.html. 
96
 Kimberly Amadeo, “U.S. Trade Deficit with China,” About.com: US Economy (2010), 
http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/us-china-trade.htm. 
97
Henry Paulson, “A Strategic Economic Engagement,” Foreign Affairs (2008), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63567/henry-m-paulson-jr/a-strategic-economic-engagement. 
98
 Amadeo, “U.S. Trade Deficit with China.” 
H o u  | 24 
 
August 2006  4,758.2  26,713.3  -21,955.2  
September 2006  4,644.6  27,570.6  -22,926.0  
October 2006  4,991.3  29,388.6  -24,397.3  
November 2006  4,809.1  27,775.1  -22,966.0  
December 2006  5,208.6  24,109.2  -18,900.6  
TOTAL  55,185.7  287,774.4  -232,588.6  
 'TOTAL' may not add due to rounding.  
 Table reflects only those months for which there was trade.  
 SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233 
 
 
U.S. – China trade problems have also affected the World Trade Organization‟s trade policies 
toward China. The U.S. has made specific demands about what China can export. For example, as a 
product-specific safeguard, the U.S imposed a unilateral restriction on imports from China on conditions 
no other country has ever been required to accept as an entering member of the WTO.
99
 Surprisingly, 
China agreed both to this and to a unilateral restriction on the import of Chinese textiles and apparel from 
2005 to 2008. China was the only member of the WTO with quota restrictions such as this.
100
 U.S. 
safeguards against China can only be taken so far; however, if the U.S. really wants to encourage 
international trade, it is in its best interest not to impose these types of safeguards. 
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Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2007  4,364.2  25,635.0  -21,270.9  
February 2007  4,630.7  23,064.5  -18,433.8  
March 2007  5,479.4  22,725.4  -17,246.1  
April 2007  4,849.4  24,222.9  -19,373.5  
May 2007  5,322.7  25,338.4  -20,015.7  
June 2007  5,900.1  27,061.1  -21,161.0  
July 2007  4,779.2  28,583.4  -23,804.2  
August 2007  5,904.6  28,431.4  -22,526.8  
TOTAL  41,230.2  205,062.3  -163,832.0  
H o u  | 25 
 
From 2004 to 2008, U.S. and China further developed their relationship as economic partners. 
China hit many high points along with its surge in GDP. It played a critical role in the Six-Party Talks, 
supported the U.S. in the War on Terror, and hosted the Summer Olympics.  The U.S. reaffirmed its 
backing on the One China policy. The problems the U.S. and China faced were mostly due to trade and 
the U.S. deficit.  China cooperated with the U.S. policies to protect the U.S. market and it even agreed to 
unprecedented safeguards on Chinese imports. But, China‟s economic power was growing and soon the 
U.S. would not be able to dictate China‟s trade policies so easily. 
 The tone of U.S. and China‟s bilateral relationship changed as of September 2008 when the U.S. 
stock market crashed, the U.S. housing bubble burst and Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.
101
 In the 
next section, we will discuss the impact of the U.S. and global financial crisis on U.S.-China relations 
from September 2008 to the present. 
 
 
 
Part 3: China and the U.S. from 2008 to Present 
 
Before late 2008, the United States never felt the need to focus on trade issues with China. Trade 
with China was going well and the U.S. government did not link trade with political matters such as 
human rights violations or environmental policy. China‟s rise in economic power concerned the U.S. but 
as long as it economy was also steadily rising, there was no problem. Only after the U.S. economy 
experienced difficulties did issues with China surface. 
The financial crisis hit the U.S. in September 2008. Banks loaned money to people who could not 
afford it allowed them to reap profits from the interest on those loans. In addition, the housing bubble 
burst. People had purchased homes they could not realistically afford and their mortgages were foreclosed. 
The banks knew that these people would most likely be unable to pay, but greed and the desire to 
overspend more money than acquired created the financial crisis. The stock market plummeted to rates 
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not seen since the Great Depression of 1929. But, the crisis did not only affect the U.S.; the shock waves 
rippled through most parts of the world, especially in Europe and Russia. As a result, the U.S. began to 
complain about the structure of the Chinese economic and political system. 
 China, on the other hand, was scarcely affected by the global financial crisis. As seen below on 
the China GDP Growth Rate and United States GDP Growth Rate graphs, China continued to 
experience annual GDP growth even after 2008 and even made a leap of 10.7% in January 2010. The U.S. 
GDP, however, showed significant rates of decline in 2008 and 2009, with modest recovery in 2010. 
According to Li Yang, director of the Finance Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, China was cushioned from the blow of the financial crisis because China‟s financial industry 
was still in the elementary stages and its capital markets were not completely open.
102
 China also had a 
high savings ratio that could stimulate demand during a recession.
103
 Zhang Xiaojing, from the Economy 
Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stated that the financial crisis was more of 
a psychological threat than a financial one. As far as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was concerned, 
China had little investment in the company, so the effect on its economy was minimal.
104
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Rather than worry about the financial downturn, China went on an international shopping spree. 
In Nigeria, the government was in the process of renewing production licenses for some of its most 
abundant offshore oil fields.
105
 CNOOC, one of China‟s largest oil companies, tried to secure no less than 
one-sixth of Nigeria‟s production.106 China offered much more that its competitors but oil from Nigeria 
was not the only resource China sought. It wanted oil from the Congo, Brazil, and Kazakhstan, natural 
gas from Iran, and iron ore in Australia.
107
 Since 2000, China has spent about $115 billion on foreign 
acquisitions.
108
 These acquisitions no longer focus solely on natural resources. China has found much 
more than just U.S. Treasuries to invest in; buying stakes in foreign banks, utilities, and semiconductor 
companies has helped wean China from its export economy and is the next step toward China‟s 
integration into the global economy.
109
   
China still has large investments in the U.S. and the U.S. also has a significant stake in the 
Chinese market. One cannot overlook the importance of the trade ties that still exist between the two 
countries. Although China seems to be doing well with its expansion into international markets, both the 
U.S. and China should be concerned about the changing trade policies brought on by the recession. 
Protectionism in the U.S. could severely affect China‟s export based economy.  As a response to lower 
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demand, China has focused on products for the domestic market.
110
 In the long run, this actually may hurt 
the U.S. more than it hurts China. China is still developing its domestic market so it has a lot of flexibility 
to adapt to consumers. The U.S. refused to buy cheaper Chinese goods, however, could freeze consumer 
spending and slow recovery from the economic downturn. 
Because of financial hardships in the U.S., U.S. import policy has changed attitudes about 
bilateral trade. In 2009, President Obama announced that the U.S. would levy tariffs of up to 35% on tires 
from China.
111
 China responded by taking the first steps toward imposing tariffs on American exports of 
automotive product and poultry.
112
 The Chinese people, not the government, began to grow frustrated 
over the tariffs. Pervasive Chinese nationalism cannot be easily ignored by the Chinese government.
113
 
Though China‟s government is politically authoritarian, it cannot simply ignore the increasing 
dissatisfaction of Chinese consumers. By raising its own tariffs on U.S. goods, China has shown that it is 
willing to stand up to the U.S. and that U.S. trade may not be as essential to its economy as it once was.  
The stock market crash coincided with the revival of old bilateral economic problems. The 
Chinese Yuan (RMB) has always been kept artificially low by the government.  The favorable exchange 
rates encouraged U.S. business to move production into and allowed China to stay competitive as an 
export country, especially during a recession.
114
 The RMB was undervalued anywhere from 20% to 40% 
compared to the dollar and other currencies.
115
 In recent times, President Obama has even less leverage 
over China‟s currency policy than President Bush. China, determined to keep its currency devalued, was 
puzzled about why the U.S. brought up the currency dispute yet again. China thought that it should be 
praised for keeping its currency stable in times of such turmoil.
116
 The U.S., on the contrary, thought the 
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artificial values were detrimental to competitive and fair international trade. Thus, old tensions arose as 
the U.S. struggled to find ways to deal with its recession. But, the U.S. complaints about currency 
manipulation do not only affect the U.S. China itself may also be in trouble. 
China has also felt repercussions about its currency manipulation.  The government is worried 
about inflation. In 2009, the Chinese economy grew by 8.7%.
117
 This growth was due to large amounts of 
domestic spending, private investments, and speculation.
118
 But this “hot money” was also fueling 
inflation.
119
 In April 2010, two months after the U.S. announced concern with an artificially devalued 
RMB, China announced that it would allow its currency to strengthen to fight inflation.
120
 Beijing 
believed boosting up the RMB‟s purchasing power would help the Chinese population combat the 
financial crisis.
121
 Since foreign assets would become cheaper and company spending decisions would 
increase on a microeconomic level.
122
 Although the focus was mainly based on domestic economic issues, 
a stronger RMB would also relax some of the tension between the U.S. and China. However, devaluing 
the currency probably will not solve the American budget deficits, especially if it results in fewer 
purchases of U.S. Treasuries.
123
 The U.S. and China have a balancing act to play when it comes to the 
RMB. If the currency stays undervalued, the U.S. receives more money for its deficit but loses out to 
China‟s exports in international trade. If the currency is strengthened, inflation in China slows down but 
could lead to less spending on the part of the government. Currency disputes between China and the U.S. 
will continue to have problems, whether or not China revalues its currency. 
While calling for economic cooperation from China, the U.S. has complicated the process with its 
political agenda. The U.S. seriously angered China when Obama met with the Dalai Lama. The Chinese 
government firmly believes that Tibet is home to anti-China separatists under the leadership of the Dalai 
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Lama and has urged the U.S. to stop “conniving” with the spiritual leader.124  Furthermore, Beijing 
blames that the U.S. meeting with the Dalai Lama contradicted U.S. policy that states Tibet is a part of 
China.
125
 A CNN poll revealed that most Americans think Tibet should be a separate state but recognize 
that good relations with China are far more important.
126
 China and the U.S. need each other, especially in 
tough economic times. The U.S. acknowledged China‟s opposition to the Dalai Lama and Obama did not 
hold his meeting in the Oval Office, but tensions continue to remain high.
127
 There is always the risk that 
the Chinese government could retaliate by cutting political ties as it did earlier with France and 
Germany.
128
 
Another reason for tension was the U.S. sale of weapons to Taiwan in January 2010. All the 
weapons were for Taiwan‟s defense communications network.129 China naturally was not pleased by this 
announcement. It has always intended to restore control of Taiwan and currently aims more than one 
thousand ballistic missiles at the island.
130
 In 2008, China already most military dialogue with the Bush 
Administration when it approved a $6.5 billion arms package for Taiwan.
131
  
Lastly, Chinese internet censorship created issues with Google and the U.S. government has 
criticized China‟s internet freedom. China has built dams, high-speed rail lines and skyscrapers with 
abandon but when it comes to online information, China has come to a halt.
132
 China censors everything 
from its TV media and traditional print media to social networking sites and text messages.
133
 The internet 
has not been excluded from these restrictions. Beijing intends to guide public opinion and censorship 
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helps it do just that. Google Inc., like all foreign business that wanted to enter the massive Chinese market, 
was given a choice between giving in to Chinese censorship or leaving the market to its rivals.
134
 Google 
chose to leave. An example of Chinese internet censorship is that for “carrot”. The reason for this is that 
you cannot type the Chinese word “carrot” without encountering a blank screen.135 President Hu Jintao‟s 
name has some of the same characters as the word for carrot. Google felt that the restrictions placed on it, 
along with technology leaks were simply too much of a burden to continue business with China. The 
effect for the Chinese market may not be seen for a while but if China continues to restrict access to 
information, it will hurt its links to the global economy.
136
 Also, without Google‟s technology, the 
Chinese web space will stagnate, since Chinese internet companies do little research and simply copy 
from each other.
137
 Google has moved to Hong Kong, where access is less restricted.
138
 This is a short-
term solution, but Google‟s dilemma once again reminds people of the contentious relationship between a 
democratic and a communist state. Different ideologies can cause serious political problems with 
international companies.  The U.S. wants to hold China to its international business standards, including 
unrestricted access to information, but China believes that unrestricted access is a threat to its government. 
Since the global financial crisis, China had become more assertive with U.S. companies. In China‟s eyes, 
the once all-powerful United States has buckled under the weight of the crisis and is no longer 
untouchable. China wants to mimic what other countries, especially the U.S., do to improve their 
economies. It feels entitled to use regulations, standards, and buy-local policies, just as they do.
139
  
Additional evidence of this new assertiveness lies with China‟s actions toward protectionism, 
climate change and Iran‟s nuclear goals. Since the recession, China has been focusing on its domestic 
industries and looking to other places to invest its money. But, this assertiveness does not mean China 
will not work with the U.S. on international issues. Chinese Prime Minster Wen Jiabao was widely 
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accused of obduracy during the climate-summit in Copenhagen in December 2009.
140
 This arose, in part, 
because he said he missed one leaders‟ meeting because he was not invited properly.141 But since then, 
China has restated its commitment to a 40% to 45% reduction in carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 
2020.
142
 In April 2010, China Power Engineer Consulting Corporation (CPECC) signed with General 
Electric and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency on the “technology of cycle power generation with 
coal and carbon capture and storage technology”.143 This technology will reduce energy costs while also 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions, showing China still cares for its image and reputation as a global 
leader. As for Iran‟s nuclear program, China was reluctant to jeopardize its oil interests in Iran over its 
nuclear program, despite concerns about this in the U.N. Security Council. In fact the International Crisis 
Group stated that China would still be likely to delay action if other U.N. members unanimously 
supported more sanctions.
144
 As before, China tried to water down the sanctions.
145
 In March 2010, China 
agreed formally to sit down and have a serious conversation about sanctions against Iran for failure to 
comply with international regulations on nuclear programs, though there is still uncertainty about how far 
China will carry these talks.
146
 China respects Iran‟s right as a sovereign nation to have a nuclear program. 
As a new global leader, China will challenge any U.S. foreign policy that does not coincide with China‟s 
own goals for economic expansion. 
 Issues with Iran, censorship, currency, and more have all been a part of the U.S.-China 
relationship since 1989. As with earlier economic changes in both economies, the financial crisis 
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correlates with rising political tensions since 2008. China and the U.S. have faced a multitude of political 
and economic issues. The stock market crash made the U.S. more aggressive towards China‟s devalued 
currency, Taiwan, and censorship policies. China has also become more confident now that most Chinese 
look at the U.S. with less awe and admiration. Its global shopping spree from oil to banks has shown that 
it is diversifying its hold on the market. But, these new economic strategies put strain on bilateral 
relations. The U.S. wants a higher valued Yuan to keep the U.S. economy competitive and it is still 
concerned about China‟s stance on world issues like climate change and nuclear states.  
There always will be political ramifications for economic success and failure. It has become 
difficult for the U.S. to convince China to agree to its terms on trade issues. China, as sovereign country, 
can do what it wants more or less. Instead of confronting China on issues that it cannot change, the U.S. 
should pick its battles with China. China is willing to work with the U.S. with peace keeping efforts so 
the U.S should focus on that aspect of global politics. It should not try to push what it cannot control, like 
China‟s currency or censorship. These domestic issues are of lesser significance to the U.S.‟s overall goal 
of economic recovery and will eventually play themselves out.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
As the data in the above three sections show, economic progress has contributed to sometimes 
shaky bilateral relationship between the United States and China. Since 1989, American policy towards 
China has changed given the conditions both of its own economy and of China‟s. As American power 
begins to dwindle and China‟s began to grow exponentially, trade imbalances and exchange rates have 
become big issues for the U.S. Before 2008, the U.S. rarely brought up China‟s human rights issues even 
though government censorship and curtailed minority rights were widespread. Even when human rights 
issues were criticized by the U.S. government, follow-up action was rare. 
  United States leverage over trade also has diminished over the years. The U.S. went from being a 
single player to having to depend on the support of other countries. Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary, said that it was China‟s “choice” to change its currency; all the U.S. can do is provide China 
with reasons why it should.
147
 He also has been very cautious about his approach to China, not wanting to 
seem like he‟s pushing China too hard towards currency revaluation.148 Economist Stephen Green at the 
Shanghai office of Standard Chartered said that Geithner would have to choose his words carefully and 
that the whole process was a delicate balancing act.
149
 Everything must go slow and steady; otherwise, 
China would not be willing even to hear complaints. U.S. policy towards China currently is like walking 
on eggshells. Everything is handled with caution because of America‟s deep interdependence with China. 
  China‟s economic rise also has created a lot of myths about its power. Surveys have shown that 
people think the U.S. is now at the mercy of China.
150
 According to the Pew Research Center, 44% of 
Americans believe that China is already the world‟s top economic power.151 In reality, the relationship is 
based on their interdependence and China does not have as much power as people think it does. China‟s 
vast holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds will not give it power over negotiations with Washington. Its 
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holdings are more like deposits and like any depositor, China has little ability to tell the U.S. how to run 
its business.
152
 China could take its money elsewhere but its deposits are so large that the U.S. is the only 
country that can hold them.
153
 Also, China‟s inflated currency is not just an issue for the U.S. but for 
China as well. China‟s top economic policymakers have admitted that the RMB should rise but that kind 
of policy change will need more time to develop.
154
 Though China‟s rapid growth has produced 
misconceptions about its abilities, its troubles and opportunities do affect the U.S. and other countries. 
Nonetheless, given its new share of economic power, the U.S. needs to alter its approach to Chinese 
policies.  
Looking into the future, China and the United States both face new challenges with each other 
and the rest of the world.  In the past two years, both China and the U.S. have changed their domestic 
policies and those policies could have international implications. For the U.S., the financial crisis was a 
major blow to both its economic power and mentality. The financial crisis questioned American economic 
stability and its ability to maintain its status as a great power.  China‟s eyes began to wonder away from 
investment in the U.S. to more promising sights elsewhere. China may not want to continue putting all its 
money into the U.S. because of the weakened dollar. It has even suggested that the dollar should be 
reevaluated as the currency of global exchange.
155
  
 China has seen change in its own domestic sphere. Many have assumed that China‟s economy has 
grown mainly because of its access to cheap labor.
156
 That may have been the case in the past but now, as 
China matures as a state, infrastructure and access to education allow people to obtain more productive 
jobs in cities.
157
 Also, the number of young entry level laborers (aged fifteen to twenty-four) is projected 
to decrease by one third in the next twelve years.
158
 Without an abundance of young workers, wages can 
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only go up. More surprisingly, China‟s workers have begun to create unions. At Honda manufacturing 
plants around China, workers went on strike, demanding an increase in wages.
159
 The Chinese 
government allowed for these protests to continue since they are protesting a Japanese company. The 
workers won their wage increases after two days of protest.
160
 China‟s decision to allow protests about 
low wages with Japanese car companies could set a new precedent. It may make people brave enough to 
address grievances with American or Chinese companies, too. The age of cheap labor in China may soon 
be gone and it will change both the way the U.S. sees China and how China handles this change. 
 The bilateral relationship between China and the United States has been strained by their 
differences over political priorities and the ever-changing global environment. Some issues that the U.S 
thinks of as international, China thinks as domestic and vice versa. China supporting the War on Terror 
and treating the people of Xinjiang as potential terrorists was not the intention of the U.S. The U.S. has 
obligations to protect Taiwan but China feels like those obligations may prevent Taiwan from becoming 
part of mainland China. Situations become tense and confusing when one country views an issue as 
domestic and another views it as international. 
Taking into account the development of U.S. and China through these years of recessions, I 
believe these two countries will continue to grow apart. The U.S., to protect its own state interests and 
recover from the financial crisis, will continue to pursue more protectionist policies and encourage 
domestic spending. China, seeing the weakened U.S. economy, will continue to invest in other countries 
in Africa, the Middle East, and within its own Asian sphere. Their economic relationship will grow apart 
because their state goals are different. The U.S. wants to stabilize its economy and China wants to expand 
their own. If their economic relationship grows apart, it may also harm their political relationship since 
different interests mean the U.S. and China may be unwilling to work together on global issues in North 
Korea or the Middle East.  
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 In addition, the U.S. and China are still not equals. China is still developing. It is more equal than 
it was twenty years ago but still not at the top politically or militarily. It could be defined as having the 
status of a “Portugal” or a “South Korea”. China‟s international influence in the world is great but there is 
a lot that needs to be fixed internally within China before it can be recognized as a developed power. The 
censorship, lack of political rights, and inequalities between rural and urban areas will hinder China‟s 
progress. Though those issues seem too large for China to tackle in the coming years, China has already 
surprised the world with how fast it grew within the past twenty years. Maybe in another twenty years, 
these social and political domestic issues will be resolved and China could call itself a fair rival to the 
United States. 
 If I were to improve upon this thesis, I would have included many more independent variables to 
measure along side of GDP. Political variables like treaties and negotiations between the two states over 
the span of twenty years would have helped enhance the analysis of mixed relations during the years prior 
to China‟s sudden growth in 2004. Also, complex issues with Taiwan including U.S. agreements with 
Taiwan and China‟s policy towards Taiwan, could have been explained in more detail given more time to 
research. This thesis could have been branched out into several different topics. However, given the 
limited time to complete the project, these topics were given an abbreviated explanation. 
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